In this paper, we suggest an advanced method searching for differential trails of block cipher with ARX structure. We use two techniques to optimize the automatic search algorithm of differential trails suggested by Biryukov et al. and obtain 2~3 times faster results than the previous one when implemented in block cipher SPECK.
I. Introduction
Differential Cryptanalysis is one of the most powerful methods for the analysis of block ciphers. It uses a differential charateristic, which is a transition from the input difference to the output difference. The probability of a differential characteristic is estimated as the product of probabilities for nonlinear operations like S-boxes. So, the attack begins with computing differential distribution tables of nonlinear operations.
ARX cipher consists of modular Addition, Rotation, and eXclusive-or. Since these computations are rather simple, ARX cipher is commonly applied to a variety of light-weight block ciphers [6, 7] .
In this structure, modular addition takes the role of non-linear computation like S-box in other ciphers, so considering input and output differences of modular addition is needed. Calculating differential probability of modular addition, unlike simple S-box, two inputs and one output differences should be considered, and input and output bit size is much bigger than S-box. As a result, calculating differential probability of modular addition requires much more complexity. Therefore differential analysis of ARX cipher should begin with another approach, and Biryukov et al. suggested new method [2] . The method suggested in [2] is fairly efficient, but the more rounds are required to be analyzed, the exponentially more time is needed.
In the paper, we suggests an algorithm that improves algorithm suggested by Biryukov in aspect of computing time. Suggesting algorithm uses two techniques to reduce time complexity.
First, we introduce properties of differential probability of modular addition, and describe block cipher SPECK in Section 2. Then we explain the algorithm suggested by Biryukov and new improved algorithm in Section 3, and 4 respectively. Finally, we concludes the paper in Section 5. In Fig. 1 ,   and   means 16-bit word in SPECK32, and 32-bit word in SPECK48.   means round key of -th round.
-th round can be expressed as follows:
Since key schedule of SPECK has little thing to do with searching differential path, for more details about key schedule, see [3] . 
Also,  value an be found looking at carries occurring when operating modular addition and difference of carries. That is,  calculation requires  complexity, for -bit  calculation checks -bit information, . Theorem 2.
[4] Given two input difference  and , an output difference , every possible (every differential probability that is not zero) differential probability satisfies following equation. Also the converse is true.
Therefore if  of two input difference  and , and an output difference  is not zero, then for  ∈      ,
Two theorems above is verified in [4], and in [4], Lipmaa proposed an algorithm calculating . [2] Differential attack begins with generating difference distribution table, DDT, of non-linear operation. In case of S-box, if input difference has -bit, and output difference has -bit, then the size of DDT is  × -bit. On the other hand, DDT of modular addition requires two input and on output difference of -bit, making size of DDT   -bit. If input and output difference consist of more than  -bit each, DDT should have more than   elements, requiring more than TB memory. Biryukov suggested new method that can find differential trail not using DDT [2] . Theorem 3. [2]  decreases, as size of input and output difference increase. Therefore, given input and output differences, , , and , the following equation is satisfied.
Biryukov et al. use theorem 3 to search for differential trail bit by bit based on a branch-and-bound search strategy. For  -th round, given input difference, we can calculate each  adding one bit into output difference. If calculated  is greater than the bound probability, we add one more bit to output difference or go to the next round. In case of first round, we need to consider the input differences also.
The bound probability,   , is the best probability of -th round differential trail that is already known. For the first round, we consider every input and output difference pair that the differential probability,   , satisfies the inequality   ×     ≧   . For the     -th round we consider output difference that the   satisfies the inequality In this chapter, we introduce how to reduce computation complexity of algorithm 2 given in [2] . In particular, we describe two techniques. One is reduce the complexity by not calculating impossible trails. The other is calculating  bitwise.
Optimizing Differential Trail Searching
In order to take shorter time, one of the main ideas suggested in this paper is to discard impossible differential trails (zero probability differential trails).
In Algorithm 2, one bit (0 or 1) is added to a trail and check whether  is 0 or not. If the probability is 0, then the algorithm returns and consider the next bit. For -bit word, the  computation complexity, , is necessary.
However in Algorithm 1,  is first calculated to check if  is zero or not (1.) . This part can be expressed as following theorem. To sum up, given input differences, if  -th bit of input and output differences are one of these form -   or   , we can expect only one bit possible for the next bit. Total complexity decreases by  ×   ((Probability of    or   ) × (Possible next output bit)).
Bitwise  computation
For -th round, to add one more round to differential trail,       computation complexity is required since we need to calculate  every time one more bit is added. For total  round, ×     computation complexity is needed.
Look at -bit of two input differences and output difference,   ,   ,   . Then we can expect possible next bit   ,   , and   by 4.1 section. If we check -th bit of differences,   ,   , and   , we can conclude           →      is equal to       →    multiplied by 1 or 1/2. This procedure is same as find out whether for  such that  ≦   , the equation Thus, for total  round and -bit word, total complexity is  × . Table 2 shows -th bit and corresponding  -th bit of input and output differences possible and probability which will be multiplied By Table 2 , if  -th bit of input and output differences are same, the probability remains still, and -th bit is determined as four cases. If not, all cases are possible and the probability decreases by 1/2. Applying this method lets not to search for the zero probability trails, and lets to compute bitwise.
Results
Biryukov used HPC cluster to reduce the computing time for more than 7 rounds. However we failed to make same system environment, so we compared the time in less than 8 rounds of SPECK32, and 7 rounds of SPECK48.  SPECK32 SPECK48 Prob. time time' Prob. time time' 1 0 0sec 0sec 0 0sec 0sec 2 -1 0sec 0sec -1 0sec 0sec 3 -3 0sec 0sec -3 0sec 0sec 4 -5 0sec 0sec -6 0sec 0sec 5 -9 0sec 0sec -10 1sec 1sec 6 -13 1sec 1sec -14 3sec 3sec 7 -18 1min 26sec -19 1min 33sec 8 -24 34min 11min - Table 3 shows that despite poor computer specifications, the results are two to three times better. Thus if we use same computer specifications or HPC cluster, it is obvious that we can get better results.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed more efficient algorithm than algorithm that Biryukov suggested. However for more than 8 rounds, time took too long to get better trails in SPECK48. So we suggested some ways to reduce time by 1/2 to 1/3 (Algorithm 3). If we apply this method, we are sure that we can get longer differential trail.
Algorithm 3 can be applied to many different ARX cipher.
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